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The Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 
803( 4) in Child Abuse Cases 
I. Introduction 
Recent public awareness of child 
abusel has brought to the forefront 
the problems which face the vic-
tim,2 the prosecution, and the defen-
dant at trial. Existing tensions be-
tween the Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation, state interests, and 
the rule against hearsay with its 
assorted exceptions intensify when 
the child abuse victim discloses the 
perpetrator's identity during medi-
cal diagnosis and treatment. In many 
instances, these statements create 
the sole means of identifying the 
defendant as the guilty party. The 
prosecution, therefore, will often at-
tempt to admitthis evidence through 
the testimony of a non-declarant 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 
(hereinafter FRE) 803(4), as state-
ments for the purposes of medical 
diagnosis and treatment, or an analo-
gous state exception.3 
Child abuse most often occurs in 
secrecy,4 with the child and the 
abuser being the only witnesses. 
Problems arise when the abused 
child fails to meet competency re-
quirements, S is unavailable fortesti-
mony, or recants testimony while 
on the stand.6 Under these circum-
stances, the prosecution must at-
tempt to elicit the victim's prior 
statements through other witnesses 
under an exception to the hearsay 
rule.' 
This article will focus on how 
statements made by the victim to 
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physicians, psychiatrists, or psy-
chologists8 create multiple hearsay 
problems when they describe events 
or identify the perpetrator. It first 
will discuss background law on hear-
say and Rule 803(4). Second, it will 
discuss the need for a hearsay ex-
ception in child abuse prosecutions. 
Third, it will examine the physician's 
and psychologist's roles in the diag-
nosis and treatment of the abused 
child. Finally, this article will ex-
amine the case law relevant to the 
admission of out-of-court statements 
made in the course of medical diag-
nosis and treatment which divulge 
the cause of the abuse or the identity 
of the abuser. 
II. Background Law 
A. Rule Against Hearsay 
Hearsay is a statement made by 
an out-of-court declarant which is 
offered into evidence for its truth as 
to the matter asserted. 9 Federal Ru Ie 
of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay 
as "a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted."lo Assertions may be 
either verbal or non-verbal. II In the 
abuse context, a child makes a ver-
bal assertion when she speaks, 
writes, or responds to questions by 
the physician or psychologist. A 
non-verbal assertion occurs, for ex-
ample, when in response to a ques-
tion a child nods her head 12 or points 
to part of her body or to that of an 
anatomically-correct doll. 
Under this definition, non-hear-
say statements would be those which 
are not offered for the truth of con-
tent or those made by a declarant 
while testifying under oath, subject 
to cross-examination, before the trier 
offact. 13 Forinstance, observations 
by a witness that a child has used 
inappropriate vocabulary or has pre-
cocious sexual knowledge could be 
admitted as circumstantial evidence 
of the child's exposure to sexual 
activity. These same observations, 
however, would be hearsay if ad-
mitted to prove their truth that the 
defendant abused this child. 14 
The rule against hearsay (herein-
after the "hearsay rule") assumes 
that many possible inaccurate and 
untrustworthy sources underlie the 
bare untested assertion of an out-of-
court declarant. "The opponent is 
unable to confront and cross exam-
ine the real witness (the declarant) 
and to expose weaknesses in his 
statement."IS 
B. Exceptions to the Rule Against 
Hearsay 
While cross-examination may be 
the best means for establishing the 
truth of statements made by a 
declarant,16 exceptions to the hear-
say rule have developed at common 
law.11 More recently, some ofthese 
exceptions have been codified in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE 
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803 and 804),18 as well as in various 
state codes.19 These exceptions pro-
vide an avenue for admitting hear-
say based on the assumption that 
''the declarant's truthfulness is ... 
clear from the surrounding circum-
stances. "20 As statements admitted 
under these exceptions are inher-
ently reliable and trustworthy, the 
test of cross-examination has "mar-
ginal utility."21 
C. Balancing Sixth Amendment 
Rights with the Needfor Hearsay 
The Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, made applicable 
to the states by way of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provides "[t]hat 
in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall have the right ... to be 
confronted with witnesses against 
him ... .'>22 This right encompasses 
three elements: (1) the rightto cross-
examine the witness, (2) the right to 
have the jury view the witness' de-
meanor, and (3) the right to face-to-
face confrontation with the witness. 23 
"The Confrontation Clause acts 
in tandem with the hearsay rule to 
afford criminal defendants the right 
to confront available accusatory 
witnesses in court, where theirtesti-
mony is given under oath before the 
fact finder, and where the defendant 
may subj ectthe testimony to search-
ingcross-examination."24 Taken lit-
erally, the Sixth Amendment pre-
vents evidence which falls within a 
hearsay exception from being ad-
mitted against the accused.25 The 
Supreme Court, however, has never 
interpreted the Confrontation Clause 
to exclude the admission of all hear-
say.26 
Conflicts between the Sixth 
Amendment and hearsay can arise 
regardless of the availability ofthe 
declarant. When the declarant is 
available, she can confinn or refute 
hearsay admitted under an excep-
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tion and then be subject to cross-
examination. When the declarant is 
unavailable, a greater danger of 
faulty fact finding arises as she can-
not be scrutinized under cross-ex-
amination. 
In order to admit hearsay, the 
prosecution may need to first dem-
onstrate the unavailability of the 
declarant and the necessity of the 
statement,27 and second demonstrate 
that the statement bears adequate 
"indicia of reliability."28 For the 
most part, however, out-of-court 
statements are admissible when they 
fall within a "finnly rooted hearsay 
exception" or have been shown from 
the totality of the circumstances to 
demonstrate a "particularized 
guarantee of trustworthiness."29 
Firmly-rooted exceptions would be 
those recognized at common law 
and those by rule. Those created by 
statute do not fall within this group, 
because they require the proponent 
to demonstrate reliability and trust-
worthiness.3o 
D. Statements Made for the Pur-
poses of Medical Diagnosis and 
Treatment. 
One finnly-rooted hearsay ex-
ception makes statements made for 
the purposes of medical diagnosis 
and treatment admissible. Under 
the common law,31 this exception 
excluded statements made to the 
non-treating physician for the sole 
purpose of providing testimony. 
This exclusion was based on the 
belief that such statements had no 
guarantee of truthfulness. Rule 
803(4), however, does not differen-
tiate between treating and non-treat-
ing physicians. 32 Rule 803(4)33 pro-
vides that: 
The following are not ex-
cluded from the hearsay rule 
even though the declarant 
is available as a witness: 
(4) Statements for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain or 
sensation, or the inception 
or general character of the 
cause or external source 
thereof insofar as reason-
ably pertinent to diagnosis 
and treatment. 
Statements admitted under this 
exception relate to medical history, 
to bodily feelings (past or present), 
or to inception or general cause of 
the injury or the disease.34 "[Rule 
803(4)] does not embrace statements 
or parts of statements which are not 
reasonably pertinent" to either diag-
nosis or treatment. 35 
The trustworthiness of such state-
ments is based on two independent 
rationale. First, the person seeking 
medical attention serves her own 
self-interest by giving truthful in-
fonnation in order to receive accu-
rate diagnosis and treatment. 36 Sec-
ond, if a medical expert would rely 
on such a statement as a basis for 
diagnosis or treatment, the state-
ment is reliable.37 The motivation 
to receive proper medical attention 
reduces the dangers of untruthful-
ness. Such a declarant is less likely 
to (1) give an inaccurate description 
of intimate events, (2) have a poor 
recollection of bodily feelings and 
condition, (3) lack knowledge re-
garding her experience with symp-
toms, and (4) articulate ambigu-
ously.38 
Because a motivation to promote 
an accurate diagnosis and treatment 
is crucial to the statement's reliabil-
ity, no requirement exists that the 
statement be made to a physician.39 
Statements made by third parties40 
could qualify under this exception if 
this person has an interest in the 
well-being of the patient, such as a 
parenf41 or relative.42 In most sce-
narios, a non-abusive parent would 
have no motive to mislead the phy-
sician and would be able to describe 
the child's symptoms based on her 
intimacy with the child. The rela-
tionship between the declarant and 
the child, therefore, detennines the 
admissibility of the hearsay.43 
Statements attributing fault or-
dinarily do not qualify under the 
language of Rule 803(4) unless the 
statement reasonably pertains to di-
agnosis or treatment. 44 These state-
ments are considered less reliable 
because the declarant may be moti-
vated by a desire other than to assist 
in diagnosis or treatment. 4S 
Special problems arise when 
statements are made to psycholo-
gists by their patients. 46 Rule 803 (4) 
does not expressly cover statements 
made pertaining to the declarant's 
mental health. Statements made to 
the psychologist which are then re-
layed to the physician fall within the 
language of Rule 803(4) as "state-
ments made for the purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment."47 
These statements, irrespective of 
their context, are pertinent because 
experts in psychology view all men-
tal processes as being relevant to 
diagnosis and treatment. 48 Such 
statements, nevertheless, may lack 
reliability because the patient's men-
tal impainnent my have decreased 
her ability to accurately describe, 
recall, perceive, or clearly articulate 
the events. 
III. The Need For Hearsay And 
The Use of FRE 803(4) In Child 
Abuse Cases 
Out-of-court statements made by 
abused children are often essential 
to the state's case. These statements 
are admissible when the court has 
detennined that the child is incom-
petent orunavailable fortestimony. 49 
While the state may have sufficient 
proofthatchildabusehas occurred, so 
this abuse, especially that of asexual 
nature,sl most often occurs in secret 
with the child being the sole person 
who can identify the assailant. S2 
Circumstantial evidence, therefore, 
becomes crucial to the state's case. 
This would include expert testi-
mony, character evidence, and hear-
say elicited through testimony of a 
physician and/or psychologist. 
The use of out-of-court state-
ments made to physicians and psy-
chologists conflicts with the 
defendant's right to confrontation. 
In deciding whether to admit such 
statements, the court must strike a 
balance between the societal inter-
ests of protecting the child and pun-
ishing the abuser with its own role 
in promoting accurate fact finding. 
In dealing with these out-of-court 
statements, the court has three op-
tions. It may refuse to admit the 
statement, pennit the statement to 
come in under an established excep-
tion, or admit the statement through 
statutorily-created child abuse ex-
ceptions. This last option pertains to 
an attempt by state legislatures to 
deal with testimonial problems in 
child abuse cases. Maryland has 
two such exceptions: the Closed 
Circuit Television Exception and 
the Child Abuse Hearsay Excep-
tion. 
The Closed Circuit Television 
ExceptionS3 protects an allegedly 
abused child from experiencing 
emotional trauma which would in-
hibit her ability to reasonably com-
municate before the court. Afterthe 
judge detennines that a child is un-
able to communicate in front of the 
defendant, the child testifies outside 
of the court in a room with counsel 
for both sides present. This room 
contains equipment operators, and 
unless the defendant objects, any 
person the court believes contrib-
utes to the child's well-being. 54 
While this exception provides an 
avenue for obtaining in-coUrt testi-
mony from the child, it also pro-
vides a means for the defendant to 
see the child and to question the 
child about statements made to the 
physician. ss 
The Child Abuse Hearsay Ex-
ception 56 establishes limited condi-
tions under which out-of-court state-
ments made by abused children can 
be admitted for the truth of the mat-
ter asserted. To invoke this rule, the 
child must be either available to 
testify in court or by closed circuit 
television, or shown to be unavail-
able. 57 
If the child is not available, the 
hearsay offered through this excep-
tion must not be admissible under 
any other exception and must be 
corroborated by the evidence. 58 This 
means the state must prove that the 
statement it proffers possesses "par-
ticularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness."s9 
In a sexual abuse case where the 
prosecution has no corroborative 
evidence, the latter requirement may 
be most difficult to prove. When 
corroborative evidence does exist, 
the statement may be inadmissible 
because it had not been specifically 
made to a physician, teacher, social 
worker, orpsychologist in the course 
of her profession.60 The state will, 
therefore, use this latter exception 
only when it cannot get the child's 
statement in the record under one of 
the "firmly rooted" exceptions such 
as Rule 803(4). 
Rule 803(4) is better suited for 
this purpose because statements ad-
mitted under this exception are as-
sumed to be trustworthy. Conflicts 
between the use of Rule 803(4) and 
the Confrontation Clause are less-
ened when the child is available to 
testify and can refute or verify the 
hearsay. When the child cannot 
testify, this rule does not require a 
showing of the declarant's unavail-
ability or proof of notice to the de-
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fendant which are required under 
the child abuse hearsay exception. 
IV. The Role of The Physician or 
Psychologist in Child Abuse Cases 
"At a time of shortened social 
services and of increasing visibility 
of family violence, it is often the 
medical office or pediatric emer-
gency department that serves as the 
portal of entry into the service sys-
tem.'>61 The physician, bound by the 
Hippocratic oath,62 has a duty to 
diagnose and treat patients accu-
rately. When child abuse is sus-
pected, the physician has two obli-
gations: (1) a duty to treat the 
physical and emotional conse-
quences of abuse, and (2) a statutory 
duty63 to report suspected abuse to 
authorities. Any medical history, 
therefore, which establishes the im-
mediate treatment needs and raises 
a level of suspicion regarding the 
possibility of abuse should be care-
fully recorded. 
A proper evaluation of an alleg-
edly abused child usually includes 
an initial history and social assess-
ment, a physical examination, diag-
nostic tests, and an investigative 
interview.64 Reports of suspected 
abuse are made when sexual abuse 
has been alleged or the injury is 
inconsistent with the history ob-
tained for the child's developmental 
age.6S 
A. The Use of Child Advocacy Teams 
Many hospitals have created 
Child Advocacy Teams66 which take 
a non-partisan role in determining 
whether there is evidence of neglect 
which should be referred to the au-
thorities.67 This team typically in-
cludes a pediatrician, a nurse,68 a 
social worker, and a psychologist or 
psychiatrist. Referrals most often 
come from within the hospital 
through a clinical unit or the emer-
gency room. They may also come 
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from an outside referral source such 
as a pediatrician's office. 
Once the team accepts a referral, 
the social worker takes an initial 
history and social assessment. The 
pediatrician or nurse practitioner69 
performs a physical examination and 
orders any necessary diagnostic tests. 
The psychologist or social worker70 
conducts an investigative interview 
which may include the use of ana-
tomically-correct dolls to enable an 
inarticulate victim to demonstrate 
the event. The physician leading the 
team uses the information obtained 
by its members to diagnose the type 
of abuse and to establish a therapeu-
tic plan ofcare.71 
B. The Evaluation of the Child 
The evaluation ofthe child con-
sists ofa medical history, a physical 
examination, a developmental ex-
amination, and a diagnostic evalua-
tion. 
a. Medical History 
The medical history provides a 
means for the physician to construct 
a time line of salient events associ-
ated with suspected abuse. This 
information is obtained in separate 
interviews from each available par-
ent while the child is not present. 
The rationale behind this tactic lies 
in the beliefthat parents72 and chil-
dren will be less fearful of disclos-
ing abuse when other parties are not 
present. 73 As child abuse and ne-
glect are symptomatic of a dysfunc-
tional family,14 the physician must 
remain attentive to discrepancies 
between the comments of each par-
ent and the child. Suspect com-
ments include persistently negative 
characterizations of the child, dis-
parities between each parent's view 
of the child, and their individual 
descriptions of parenting practices. 
A pediatric history usually starts 
with neutral questions regarding the 
child's size at birth and attainment 
of certain developmental milestones, 
such as putting words together at an 
early age. The parent is questioned 
about the child's behavior, with at-
tention to recent changes in behav-
ior. Finally, the parent is ques-
tioned about specific injuries to de-
terminethe level of risk to the child 75 
b. Physical Examination 
The type of physical examina-
tion the child must undergo depends 
upon the original complaint that 
precipitated the visit to the physi-
cian. "Physicians must approach an 
injury as a symptom requiring a 
diagnosis of cause," as accidental 
injuries may be difficult to distin-
guish from non-accidental ones.76 
Though signs and symptoms of 
abuse may be blatant, the majority 
are subtle in nature.77 The physi-
cian, therefore, must have an under-
standing ofthe common manifesta-
tions of child abuse.78 
During a routine physical ex-
amination, the physician inspects 
the child's body for bruising, defor-
mities, and trauma. 79 She listens to 
the chest and abdomen for irregu-
larities. She visualizes the retina of 
the eye to observe retinal bleeding 
or lesions and the oral cavity to 
detect mucosal lesions or dental 
trauma. She examines the inner ear 
to identify eardrum perforations and 
other deformities. Digital and vi-
sual examinations80 of inner vaginal 
and rectal areas are performed only 
if there are complaints, symptoms, 
or suspect surface areas. 
c. Developmental Examination 
The physician must evaluate the 
child's motor skills to determine if 
the reported cause of an accident is 
consistent with the child's develop-
mental age. Accidental injuries re-
quire the child to have certain motor 
capabilities. For example, a fall 
from a bed is not possible if the child 
is unable to roll over. If a sibling is 
blamed by the caretaker for an in-
jury, the physician must question 
whether it is physically and devel-
opmentally possible for the sibling 
to have caused the injury.81 
d. Diagnostic Evaluation 
Diagnostic evaluation of the child 
depends largely on the results of the 
medical history and physical ob-
tained by the physician. The nature 
of the suspected injury, the possi-
bility of abuse, and the child's age 
also factor into the physician's deci-
sion to order diagnostic tests. These 
tests may include: 
1. Radiologic imaging:82 
In children under five years of 
age, bone surveys83 using roentgeno-
grams (x-rays), or more sophisti-
cated radionuclide skeletal 
scintigraphy (bone scans), detect 
fractures and other skeletal injuries 
not identified with conventional x-
ray techniques. 
The CT ICA T scan tests can iden-
tify acute and chronic head injuries 
and facilitate the diagnosis of ab-
dominal injuries. 
2. Laboratory studies: 
Samples of any fluids are sent to 
the laboratory for identification. 
These fluids might include semen 
found during an external or internal 
vaginal or rectal examination. 
Cultures are taken if sexual abuse 
has been reported or to interpret the 
clinical findings of sexually trans-
mitted diseases (hereinafter SID'S)84 
when no sexual abuse information 
has been elicited from the child or 
parent.8S 
Based on the findings of the 
medical history, physical, develop-
mental evaluation, and diagnostic 
tests, the diagnosis of suspected 
abuse is made. The physician then 
is obligated to report this suspicion 
to the appropriate authorities. 
C. The Role of the Psychologist 
A psychologist also may playa 
similar role in the evaluation of an 
abused child. Because a parent will 
not usually bring the child to a psy-
chologist for evaluation, the psy-
chologist ordinarily becomes in-
volvedupon referral from thephysi-
cian or the child advocacy team. 
After the treatment of associated 
medical problems,86 the psycholo-
gist then evaluates the child to as-
certain and treat the psychological 
consequences of abuse. A variety of 
treatment modalities, such as thera-
peutic play and art, may be used to 
facilitate communication with the 
child.87 Diagnosis and treatment 
may also involve an evaluation of 
other family members. 
V. Statements as to Cause and 
Identity in Abuse Cases 
The infonnation obtained dur-
ing medical and psychological di-
agnosis and treatment often pro-
vides evidence for prosecuting the 
abuser. The state's ability to protect 
the child frequently rests on the 
physician's or psychologist's re-
sponse to the child and her ability to 
observe and record. Though the 
victim may be aware of possible 
criminal charges being brought 
against the abuser, courts have per- . 
mitted hearsay testimony from phy-
sicians and psychologists regarding 
the cause of the abuse.88 These same 
assertions, however, are inadmis-
sible when the physician or psychia-
trist performs the evaluation in 
preparation for impending civilliti-
gation. 89 This is because statements 
made to the practitioner may have 
motivations other than the need for 
diagnosis and treatment and are, 
therefore, less reliable. 
Rule 803(4) has been used in 
child abuse cases to admit into evi-
dence those assertions made to phy-
sicians and psychologists which 
describe symptoms and the general 
cause of the abuse.90 Dispute over 
the admissibiIity of these statements 
centers around whether they meet 
the requirement that such statements 
be "pertinent to diagnosis and treat-
ment." 
A physician ordinarily may not 
testify under Rule 803(4) that a child 
told her the identity ofthe abuser.91 
The rationale behind this rule stems 
from the belief that the doctor has a 
responsibility to diagnose and treat, 
rather than to investigate illegal con-
duct, 92 Additionally, if the victim 
believes she is being asked the iden-
tity of the perpetrator, the reliability 
of the statement may be destroyed. 93 
Trustworthiness does remain intact, 
however, when the same statement 
has been motivated by the desire to 
aid medical diagnosis and treatment. 
In order for a court to admit these 
out-of-court statements under Rule 
803(4), the child must have been 
able to formulate the medical prob-
lem and communicate this problem 
to some other person for the pur-
poses of diagnosis and treatment.94 
Children are often too young to ap-
preciate the necessity of truthful-
ness in obtaining treatment, or to 
understand "the relationship be-
tween their statements and receiv-
ing effective medical treatment.'>9S 
For example, statements made dur-
ing play therapy can create prob-
lems for the court. In determining 
admissibility, the court must first 
decide whether the play sessions are 
congruent with treatment or diagno-
sis. If so, the court must find that the 
child made the statement with an 
intent to assist the psychologist in 
diagnosis and treatment.96 
The competency ofthe child also 
plays a role in some courts' admis-
sion or exclusion of hearsay . Courts 
which exclude statements made by 
incompetent children do so based 
on the beliefthat a child who cannot 
appreciate the significance oftruth-
ful testimony cannot be capable of 
providing the physician with accu-
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rate infonnation.97 Other courts dif-
ferentiate between the trustworthi-
ness of statements made to physi-
cians and those made in court while 
testifying.98 "The cornerstone [in 
these courts] is whether the state-
ment is reasonably pertinent to di-
agnosis and treatment.'>99 
VI. Case Law 
In Idaho v. Wright, a 1990 deci-
sion, the Supreme Court identified 
several factors which it believed 
properly relate to the reliability of 
out-of-court assertions made by chil-
dren.lOo These factors include the 
mental state of the declarant, the use 
oftenninologyunexpected in achild 
of similar age,IOI the spontaneity 
and repetition of the statement, 102 
and a lack of motivation to fabricate 
the statement. 103 Other consider-
ations include, but are not limited 
to, the child's age, the presence of 
corroborating evidence, and the 
child's relationship to the accused 
and to the person to whom the state-
ment was made. 104 
In sexual abuse cases, questions 
concerning the reliability of out-of-
court statem.ents made by children 
center around whetherthe statements 
are intrinsically reliable. Courts 
which accept the intrinsic reliability 
of this type of hearsay justify their 
actions with two rationales: (1) chil-
dren do not persistently lie to par-
ents or other authority figures about 
sexual abuse, and (2) children have 
an insufficient knowledge base to 
lie about sexual matters. lOS Those 
courts adopting a contrary view fo-
cus on the ability of the child to tell 
stories and fantasize. 106 
In recent times, state courts have 
split as to the admissibility of state-
ments made to physicians pertain-
ing to causel07 or fault l08 in child 
abuse cases. Similar statements 
made to psychologists are on even 
weaker footing. 109 Courts admit-
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ting statements made to psycholo-
gists argue that intra-family dynam-
ics in child abuse cases create a need 
for a special interpretation of Rule 
803(4) and its application. llo This 
belief stems from the fact that there 
is a proportional increase in the re-
occurrence of abuse when the iden-
tified abuser is a family member. 
Several federal cases have influ-
enced the states' expansion of Rule 
803(4). In UnitedStatesv. Iron Shell, 
the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that it 
was not error to allow into evidence 
statements made by a nine year-old 
child pertaining to her sexual as-
sault. III The court reasoned that the 
victim's statements to the examin-
ing physician related to the child's 
physical condition and were thus 
consistent with a motivation for 
treatment.ll2 
The Iron Shell court established 
a two-part test for detennining the 
admissibility of hearsay under this 
exception. "First, is the declarant's 
motive consistent with the purpose 
of the rule; and second, whether it is 
reasonable for the physician to rely 
on the infonnation in diagnosis or 
treatment."113 While the testimony 
elicited from the physician did not 
name the defendant as the assailant, 
the court noted that identity would 
rarely be sufficiently related to di-
agnosis and treatment. 114 
While Iron Shell remained within 
the bounds of Rule 803(4), this same 
court stretched these boundaries in 
United States v. Renville. lIS In 
Renville, the victim of child abuse, 
during in- court testimony, recanted 
earlier statements identifying her 
father as the abuser. The treating 
physician, over an objection, re-
peated the child's statement which 
identified her father as the abuser. 
The court of appeals affinned, find-
ing as follows: 
[A] statement by a child 
abuse victim that the abuser 
is a member of the victim's 
household presents a suffi-
ciently different case from 
that envisaged by the draft-
ers of [R]ule 803(4) that it 
should not fall under the 
general rule. Statements by 
a child abuse victim to a 
physician during an exami-
nation that the abuser is a 
member of the victim's 
immediate household are 
reasonably pertinent to 
treatment. I 16 
This logic has been criticized be-
cause its application is problematic. 
For example, in State v. Nelson, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a 
lower court ruling admitting a state-
ment made by a three year-old child 
to her psychologist. The statement 
identified the child's father, Nelson, 
as the perpetrator of sexual abuse. 117 
Criticism of Nelson centers 
around evidence elicited on cross-
examination that the child had on 
several occasions identified the de-
fendant, her mother's live-in boy-
friend, as the abuser.118 Without 
this statement identifying Nelson, 
the defendant might have been more 
successful in creating a real doubt in 
the minds of the jury that someone 
other than himself committed the 
abuse. I 19 
Other state courts have taken a 
position contrary to Renville by not 
admitting any statements of identi-
ficationunderRule803(4).InSulka 
v. State, 120 a three year-old girl sus-
tained injuries when she was struck 
in the face with a shoe. This child 
identified Sulkaas the assailant dur-
ing a physical examination by a 
physician. The Alaska Supreme 
Court held that the identification of 
Sulka was not pertinent to diagnosis 
and treatment of the child's injuries 
and that the trial court denied the 
defendant his right to confrontation opposition to Cassidy, Judges 
by admitting the statements ofiden- Wilner, Rosalyn Bell, and Pollitt 
tification. upheld a circuit court ruling which 
In Maryland, the court of special permitted testimony by a physician 
appeals has published two diametri- and a psychologist as to the child's 
cally opposed rulings on the admis- identification of the perpetrator. 12S 
sibility of statements of identity in A five year-old girl had been re-
child abuse cases. In the 1988 deci- ferred to a pediatric rape centerl26 
sion of Cassidy v. State, argued be- after her pediatrician discovered 
fore Judges Moylan, Wilner and vaginal bleeding. Thepediatrician's 
Weant, the court held that state- examinationidentifiedcertainphysi-
ments to a physician by a two year- cal findings consistent with sexual 
old that "Daddy did this" were inad- abuse. 121 The child was later seen 
missible. 121 The basis for this deci- on four occasions by a psycholo-
sion was the court's belief that the gist. 128 She told both the psycholo-
two year-old "lacked the motive or gist and the social worker that her 
purpose which is the heart of the father was the perpetrator. These 
trustworthiness guarantee."122 The statements were excluded by the 
court further noted that, even if the trial court pursuant to Cassidy. 
declarant in this case had the requi- The court of special appeals de-
site understanding of the nature of termined that the trial court erred in 
the medical interview, the assertion not admitting these statements. The 
would still not have been medically court differentiated the facts of this 
related to treatment. The aim of case with Cassidy by stating that 
treatment, according to the court, is "[t]here is a vast difference between 
to determine the need for physical cognitive development ofatwoyear-
measures such as surgical interven- old and a child of five. From the 
tion, antibiotics, or x-rays.123 The content, one can tell that the five 
court did note, however, that iden- year-old child understood that the 
tity might playa role in the treat- alleged secret she shared with her 
ment of a victim who contracted a father was an important one."129 
communicab Ie disease as a result of The court first suggested that 
abuse. 124 Rachel knew her statements would 
In determining the inadmissibil- be used to obtain treatment and pre-
ity of the identification, the court vent future exposure to abuse. Sec-
postulated that the Renville line of ond; it stated that the child might 
cases strained to procure the iden- have been exposed to venereal dis-
tity of the abuser into evidence. ease (using the avenue left open in 
While laudable, the Renville court the Cassidy opinion). Third, the 
effectively ignored the state of mind court postulated that ifthe mother's 
of the declarant and instead turned story that Rachel injured herself on 
to that of the physician. The focus a broom handle had been true, she 
became the mission of the physi- would have needed a tetanus shot. 
ciano The Renville court moved Based on these facts, the court de-
from statements pertinent to treat- termined that the information ob-
ment of the physical injury, to the tained from the social worker and 
emotional injury, to final social dis- psychologist were reasonably perti-
position (state reporting statutes) as nentto diagnosis and treatment, and, 
being included under Rule 803(4) in thus, admissible. 130 
child abuse cases. Reconciling these two cases is 
In In re Rachel T., a case in not an easy task. In re Rachel T., 
however, does fit neatly into 
Cassidy's dicta that a child's con-
tact with a communicable disease 
might require the admission of such 
statements. The children in these 
cases were five and two years-old 
respectively, with different injuries. 
At this point, it is difficult to predict 
whether facts of a future case will be 
found more similar to Cassidy or 
Rachel T. and thus whether the state-
ments by physicians and/or psy-
chologists will be found admissible. 
VII. Conclusion 
Child abuse most often occurs in 
secrecy, with the abused child and 
the assailant being the only wit-
nesses. In such cases, the need to 
admit hearsay becomes even more 
pressing, particularly when the child 
cannot testify or recant a previous 
statement while testifying at trial. 
This makes the need to admit the 
child's out-of-court statements cru-
cial to the fact-finding process. 
Rule 803(4), regarding statements 
for the purposes of medical diagno-
sis and treatment, provides the best 
avenue for admitting such evidence, 
because it is a "firmly-rooted excep-
tion" whose "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness" have already 
been established. The biggest prob-
lem with the use of this exception 
occurs when it is used to identify the 
alleged perpetrator of the abuse. 
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admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4»; 
State v. O/dsen, 732 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 
1986) (statements to social worker ad-
missible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4»; 
State v. Jones, 367 S.E.2d 139 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1988) (statements to social worker 
identifying perpetrator aided in medi-
cal evaluation and diagnosis of child's 
physical and behavioral problems; this 
court recognized that child had been 
taken to social worker at recommenda-
tion of physician and prosecuting attor-
ney). But see Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 
1338 (Miss. 1989) (holding that state-
ments made to a clinical social worker 
not admissible under Mississippi's ver-
sion of Fed. R. Evid 803(4». 
71See In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 
36,549 A.2d 27, 35 (1988) (holding 
that it was reasonable for a pediatrician 
to use a team approach when children 
are unwilling to talk in order to obtain 
information to make a diagnosis and to 
prescribe treatment). 
12In many cases, abused children have 
only one parent or relatives who act as 
caretakers. The persons responsible 
for the child's care would then be inter-
viewed. 
73Newberger, supra note 61, at 946. 
74American Medical Association, Di-
agnostic and Treatment Guidelines 
Concerning Child Abuse and Neglect, 
254 JAMA 797 (1985). The identifi-
able characteristics of families who 
abuse or neglect children include the 
following: (1) low family incomes (sta-
tistics to this effect may be skewed as a 
result of under-reporting of middle and 
upper-class abuse), (2) social isolation, 
(3) spousal abuse, (4) parents abused as 
children, (5) parents whose expecta-
tions for children are inconsistent with 
the child's abilities, and (6) the pres-
ence of social stressors (alcohol, drugs, 
mental illness, and inadequate living 
conditions). Id. 
7sId. at 798. 
76Johnson, supra note 1, at 811. 
77See generally Reece, Unusual Mani-
festations of Child Abuse, 37 Pediatric 
Clinics ofN. Am. 905 (1990) (discuss-
ing unusual forms of abuse such as 
pepper aspiration, intentional micro-
wave burns and cocaine). 
78Johnson, supra note 1, at 800. 
In one study of 616 children reported 
for physical abuse during the years 
1980-1982, the most common causes 
of physical abuse were belts (23%), 
open hands (22%) (choked, grabbed, 
pinched, or slapped), fists (11 %), pro-
pulsion (8%) (thrown, pushed, pulled, 
dropped or dragged) , and objects (28%) 
(stick, paddle cord, hot liquid, heater, 
stove, cigarette, etc.). The cause of 
abuse was unknown in the remaining 
cases (23%). Johnson & Showers, In-
jury Variables in Child Abuse, Child 
Abuse & Neglect 207-15 (1985). 
79Thjs head to toe assessment may es-
tablish inconsistencies in the history 
given by the child or the care giver. It 
may also reveal evidence of prior abuse 
such as old scars caused by human 
bites, cigarette bums, forced contact 
with a hot object (such as an iron), 
general neglect (such as poor skin hy-
giene), malnutrition or failure to thrive, 
and/or soft tissue swelling. Yaster & 
Haller, Multiple Trauma in the Pediat-
ric Patient, 2 Textbook of Pediatric 
Intensive Care 1265, 1312-13 (M. 
Rodgers ed. 1987). 
80Intemal examinations may include 
the use of a speculum or a colposcope: 
1. A speculum examination is pain-
ful, and therefore used only when there 
has been evidence of bleeding from an 
internal source or a penetrating wound. 
Paradise, supra note 51, at 845. 
2. Colposcopic examinations require 
the use a colposcope which provides 
the physician with a magnified view of 
the child anatomy. The examiner can 
record the results of this examination 
through the use of an attached camera. 
McCann, Use of the Colposcope in 
Child Sexual Abuse Examinations, 37 
Pediatric Clinics of N.Am. 839 (1990). 
But see De Jong & Rose, Frequency 
and Significance of-Physical Evidence 
in Legally Proven Cases of Child Sexual 
Abuse, 84 Pediatrics 758 (1989) (dem-
onstrating that in 115 cases of reported 
sexual penetration there was no differ-
ence in the conviction rates with or 
without the use of colposcopy). 
81 Johnson, supra note 1, at 806. The 
physician may have to evaluate the 
sibling to see if the cause attributed to 
her is physically possible. Id. 
82Merten & Carpenter, Radiologic Im-
aging of Inflicted Injury in the Child 
Abuse Syndrome, 37 Pediatric Clinics 
ofN. Am. 815 (1990); Wissow, supra 
------------______________ 22.11fhe Law Forum - 21 
note 64, at 57. 
83Serial blows to young children can 
result in characteristic patterns of 
healed fractures. Evidence of this fonn 
of abuse was first published in 1962. 
Kempe, Silvennan & Steele, The Bat-
tered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 
(1962). 
840ffending organisms which suggest 
sexual abuse most frequently include 
gonorrhea and chlamydia, and less fre-
quentl y include genital herpes or warts. 
As the risk of Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus (HIV) is extremely small, 
a screen for mVisdone only on request 
of the child's parents. Paradise, supra 
note 51, at 853. 
8sParadise, supra note 51, at 849-50. 
86ln the alternative, a specially trained 
social worker may conduct the evalua-
tion and develop a plan of care to deal 
with the child's specific needs. 
87See State v. Oliver, 354 S.E.2d 527 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding reason-
ably related to diagnosis drawings and 
oral statements made by a mentally 
retarded 16 year-old girl during inter-
view with psychologist). 
88State v. Herbert, 480 A.2d 742, 749 
(Me. 1984) (a 13 year-01dgirl'sknow1-
edge of possible criminal proceedings 
did not detract from the trustworthiness 
of her statement that she had engaged 
in sexual activity with an adult). 
891n one case, the court refused to admit 
statements made to a physician be-
cause the visit to her was precipitated 
by the mother's concern that the child 
had fabricated the alleged assault. State 
v. Woods, 546 A.2d 1072 (N.H. 1988). 
The child had no physical symptoms 
and offered no complaints of pain. The 
statements made were not pertinent to 
diagnosis and treatment and therefore 
were inadmissible. 
9OSeePeoplev. Galloway, 726 P.2d 249 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (infonnation ob-
tained from sexually assaulted seven 
year-old boy as to nature of assault was 
needed to perfonn a "proper evalua-
tion"). 
91 McLain, Maryland's Statutory ex-
ception, supra note 7, at 5; but see State 
v. Gray, 502 So. 2d 114 (La. 1987) 
(holding that a six year-old child's state-
ment that mother hither with a hammer 
was integral part of doctor's examina-
22 - The Law Forum/22.1 
tion). 
92Meyers, Hearsay and Child Abuse, 
supra note 7, at 892. 
93State v. Smith, 337 S.E.2d 833, 840 
(N.C. 1985). 
94State v. Boston, 545 N.E.2d 1220, 
1234 (Ohio 1989). 
9SState v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801,809 
(Ariz. 1987). 
96Capra, supra note 36, at 7, col. 3. 
97Id. at 29, col. 3. 
98See Old sen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132 
(Colo. 1986) ("a finding that a child is 
incompetent to testify does not auto-
matically render inadmissible all hear-
say statements of the child, as long as 
the reliability of the statements is en-
sured by circumstances bringing them 
within the scope of an exception to the 
hearsay rule"); see also State v. Miller, 
539 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that competency of a child is 
not a condition precedent to admissi-
bility of statements made to a physician 
under Rule 803(4»; State v. Goldade, 
674 P.2d 721 (JIyo. 1983), (holding 
that child can be competent when mak-
ing statements to physician and later be 
found to be incompetent to testify in 
court), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1253 
(1984). 
99State v. Miller, 539 N.E.2d 693, 698 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
HlOWright, 58 U.S.L.W. at 5040. 
In Wright, a mother and her boy-
friend were convicted for the sexual 
abuse of her two girls, ages five and 
one-half and two and one-half years. 
Ms. Wright appealed a conviction for 
the abuse of the younger child. This 
conviction rested on hearsay testimony 
from the treating physician. The two 
and one-half year-old was not compe-
tent to testify at trial. The Court re-
versed, finding that Wright's right to 
confrontation had been violated and 
that the statements did not qualify un-
der any exception to the hearsay rule. 
The Court made this finding based on 
its conclusion that the child's state-
ments to the physician lacked a "par-
ticularized guarantee of trustworthi-
ness." 
10lMorgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 
948 (4th Cir. 1988). 
H12Statev. Sorenson,421 N.W.2d77, 85 
(JIis. 1988). 
103Statev. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801,811 
(Ariz. 1987). 
I04State v. Boston, 545 N.E.2d 120, 
123-28 (Ohio 1989). 
10SNote, Comprehensive Approach, 
supra note 7, at 1751. 
I06Id. Seealso Sulkav. State,717P.2d 
394,401 (AlaskaCt. App. 1986) (argu-
ing that in younger children there exists 
a possibility that the child may be sub-
ject to suggestion). 
107 Sexton v. Alabama, 529 So. 2d 1041 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that 
since the child testified to the same 
infonnation at trial, statements that the 
child had complained about sodomies 
assisted the physician in detennining 
medical treatment); Sulka v. State, 717 
P.2d394 (AlaskaCt. App. 1986) (hold-
ing that the inception or general cause 
of trauma was admissible); People v. 
Galloway, 726 P.2d 249 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding admissible state-
ments obtained through questioning, 
by physician, were part of a "proper 
evaluation"); State v. Gray, 502 So. 2d 
1114 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding ad-
missible a child's statements that inju-
ries were caused by a beating with a 
hammer); State v. Herbert, 480 A.2d 
742 (Me. 1984) (holding that injuries 
sustained by the victim warranted ques-
tion by physician regarding the nature 
of sexual activity with an adult); Com-
monwealth v. Comtois, 506 N.E.2d 503 
(Mass. 1987) (holding statements made 
by children to pediatrician concerning 
sexual abuse during an examination 
were admissible); State v. Reynolds, 
378 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that statement describing 
events surrounding vaginal penetration 
was relevant to providing an examina-
tion of the child); State v. Drake, 761 
P.2d 879 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (hold-
ing that the lower court properly admit-
ted statements after an in-camera hear-
ing had been held to detennine if the 
statements as to cause were pertinent to 
diagnosis and treatment); State v. 
Bowden, 386 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 1986) 
(holding that trial court correctly ad-
mitted testimony that a child nodded 
her head to questions asked during a 
physical examination). But see State v. 
Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987) 
(holding that a statement as to cause 
had not been elicited to further diagno-
sis or treatment). 
I08See Stallnackerv. State, 715 S.W.2d 
883 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (holding ad-
missible statement identifying perpe-
trator as, the identification was perti-
nent to preventing the recurrence of the 
abuse and in the treatment of child who 
had been abused at home); State v. 
Dollinger, 568 A.2d 1058 (Conn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that the identity of 
the abuser is pertinent when the abuser 
is a member of the child's household; 
this information facilitates treatment 
of physical and psychological injuries); 
State v. Gray, 502 So. 2d 1114, 1117 
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding admis-
sible a child's statement that her mother 
had beaten her with a hammer because 
such information was an "integral part 
of the examination"); State v. Larson, 
453 N.W.2d42 (Minn. 1990) (holding 
that statements identifying father as 
abuser were pertinent to treatment); 
State v. Aguallo, 350 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. 
1986) (holding that identity of perpe-
trator was relevant to providing a safe 
environment for the victim); State v. 
Reynolds. 378 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. App. 
Ct. 1989); State v. Miller, 589 N.E.2d 
693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (admitting 
statement by child to physician which 
identified father as assailant); State v. 
Roberts. 775 P.2d 342 (Or. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding statements identifying 
mother pertinent to medical and psy-
chological treatment); State v. 
Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1988) 
(holding that statement in which the 
child identified uncle as the abuser was 
admissible through physician's testi-
mony because it was pertinent to mak-
ing a diagnosis of the physical and 
emotional condition of a child repeat-
edlysexuallyabused); Goldadev. State, 
674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983) (holding 
identity of abuser was pertinent to 
medical treatment and consistent with 
public policy of protecting children 
from abuse); Stephens v. State, 774 
P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that the 
proper foundation must be laid for state-
ments as to fault or causation to be 
admitted). But see Sulka v. State, 717 
P.2d394 (AlaskaCt. App.1986)(hold-
ing that the identity of the assailant was 
not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 
803(4), as such testimony violates the 
defendant's right to confrontation); 
W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 
1984) (holding that statements identi-
fying uncle as abuser were not perti-
nent to diagnosis or treatment because 
the child was referred to the physician 
solely for the purpose of expert testi-
mony in criminal proceedings); State v. 
Conn, 451 N.W.2d555 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1990) (holding inadmissible statements 
of identification by a seven year-old); 
State v. Camele, 360 S.E.2d 307 (S.C. 
1987) (holding inadmissible statements 
by child to doctor in which the child 
said that neither his mother nor his 
stepfather had committed the abuse 
was not admissible; the court addition-
ally held that statements that the defen-
dant had committed fellatio upon him 
were inadmissible; both of these state-
ments did not assist the doctor in deter-
mining whether the child had been 
sexually abused). 
I09See State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 
(Ariz. 1987) (holding admissible state-
ments as to cause and identity of the 
abuser; the psychologist testified that 
these statements were made during the 
course of treatment and were crucial to 
effective diagnosis and treatment); 
Statev. Larson, 453 N.W. 2d42 {Minn. 
1990) (holding that statements to a 
psychologist which identify the abuser 
are admissible as they are pertinent to 
treatment); Statev. Altgilbers, 786 P.2d 
680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that 
a statement of identity bears on the 
child's selfperception and her relation-
ship to the assailant); Macias v. State, 
776 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding admissible statements made 
for the purpose of medical diagnosis 
and treatment which were in a 
psychologist's report; the child had 
stated that the defendant had sexually 
abused her by inserting his fingers into 
hervagina);Statev.Nelson,406N.W.2d 
385 (Wis. 1987) (holding admissible 
statements identifying father as abuser 
as pertinent to diagnosis and treatment 
by two psychologists); Stephens v. 
State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989) (hold-
ing that statements ofidentity given to 
psychotherapist must have been relied 
upon for treatment or diagnosis). But 
see Wardv. State, 368 S.E.2d 139 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that statements 
identifying the perpetrator were admis-
sible only as they pertain to the 
psychologist's opinion as an expert, 
but not admissible if offered solely as a 
statement made for purposes of diag-
nosis or treatment); People v. laLone, 
437 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Mich. 1989) 
(holding that a child's statement of 
identification made to a psychologist 
did not fall within Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), 
because physician's reliance on such 
information to determine the need for 
protective measure was not "envisioned 
by the drafters"); State v. Gokey, 574 
A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990) (holding child's 
statements detailing the abuse and iden-
tifying the perpetrator inadmissible be-
cause these statements were made for 
the purpose of expert testimony). 
llOState v. Oleson, 443 N.W.2d 8, 10 
(S.D. 1989) (Henderson, J., concur-
ring). 
III United Statesv. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 
77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 
U.S. 1001 (1981). 
112Id. at 84. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
llSRenville, 779 F.2d43 0 (8thCir. 1985). 
See also United States v. Provost, 875 
F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding ad-
missible statements of cause and iden-
tification made to a physician and a 
psychologist by a ten year-old girl). 
116Id. at 436. See Morgan v. Foretich, 
846F.2d941 (4thCir.1988)(accepting 
Renville's judgment that abuse in the 
home presents a different situation 
"which requires great caution in ex-
cluding highly pertinent evidence"). 
117406 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1987). 
Nelson's daughter became distraUght 
over visitations with him. She de-
scribed several incidents of sexual abuse 
to her mother, who then carried the 
child to a psychologist. Over a period 
of sixty sessions, the child implicated 
Nelson as a possible abuser. 
Nelson's conviction was later af-
firmed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Nelson 
v. Farrey, 874F.2d 122 (7thCir. 1989). 
This court found that Nelson's right to 
confrontation had not been violated 
because statements were sufficiently 
reliable based on other hearsay evi-
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dence which had been admitted with-
out objection. The court further noted 
that psychologists employ professional 
skills to elicit truthful statements which, 
although not infallible, could be con-
sidered by a jury. Id. at 129. 
1I8Tuerkheimer, Convictions Through 
Hearsay in Child Abuse Cases: A Logi-
cal Progression Back to Square One, 
72 Marq. L. Rev. 47, 53 (1988). 
The psychologist also testified that 
she asked the child whether she would 
tell the truth; the child replied "I don't 
have to tell the truth." Nelson, 406 
N.W.2d at 396. 
II9'[uerkheimer, supra note 118, at 54. 
12°Sulka v. State, 717 P.2d. 394 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1986). 
12174 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 666 (1988). 
"This" referred to bruises on the child's 
body noted by the physician during the 
physical examination. The child had 
been brought to the hospital by a pro-
tective service worker. 
I 22Id. at 680. 
I23Id. 
I24Id. at 682 n. 14. 
12S77 Md. App. 20,549 A.2d 27 (1988). 
126Francis Scott Key Medical Center is 
one of three rape centers in the Balti-
more area. The pediatric team uses a 
multidisciplinary approach similar to a 
child advocacy team. 
127An examination of the child's vagi-
nal area revealed a blood clot at the 
hymen, a vaginal opening much larger 
than the nonn for this age, and poor 
rectal sphincter tone. 
128Using an anatomically-correct doll, 
the child identified the penis as a "tu-
tor." She named the girl doll Cindy and 
the boy doll Cindy's Dad. 
129Id. at 34. The social worker had 
infonned Rachel of the team's concern 
over the blood in her panties. 
13O'fhe court took notice of the fact that 
the pediatrician had referred the child 
to find the source of the bleeding and to 
obtain a plan for treatment. 
About the Author: 
Sharon P. O'Neill is an associate 
at Carr Goodson & Lee in Washing-
ton, D.C., specializing in health care 
issues. She is a member of the 
Maryland and Washington, D.C. 
Bars. Ms. O'Neill has a masters in 
nursing from the University ofpenn-
sylvania and a law degree from the 
University of Baltimore. Prior to 
attending law school, Ms. O'Neill 
worked for three years as a pediatric 
pulmonary nurse specialist at the 
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. 
The author gives special thanks to 
Professor Lynn McLain, University 
of Baltimore School of Law, for her 
guidance in writing this article. 
SMH MARYLAND BAR REVIEW 
FOUNDED IN 1964 - SERVING MARYLAND SINCE 1980 
Maryland Bar Candidates' Course 
Law Student Package 
• Written material - "How To" booklet, 
2-volume Law School Summaries, and the Flash 
card System 
• Exam Review Lecture Series 
Main Course 
Law Components 
• Written material - full text, summary outlines, 
flashcardds, checklists, testable points of law, 
and end-of-course 
Supreme Court and Maryland updates 
• Lectures (live, videotape, and audiotape) 
Practice Components 
• Workbook (with study strategy and practice plan) 
• "How To" class 
.2,000+ multistate questions (with analysis) 
.250+ Maryland essay questions (with analysis) 
• Three 30-minute personalized critiques 
(with approach charts) 
• Four 2-day simulated bar exams (with analysis) 
Out-Of-State Attorneys' Course 
Law Components 
• Written material - full text, summary 
outlines, flashcards, and checklists 
• Lectures (live, videotape, and audio 
tape) 
Practice Components 
• "How To" class and outline 
• 75+ Maryland essay questions (with 
analysis) 
Other Course Offerina:s 
Bar candidates' courses for 20 other states 
Multistate Professional Responsibility 
(MPRE) Course 
The Writing Workshop 
Discounts 
• Up to 30% for early registration 
• 50% to multiple-time non-SMH alumni 
• 60% to second state SMH alumni 
.75% to SMH Maryland retakers 
For additional information or printed literature, call 410-529-9220 or 1-800-927-6536. 
24 - The Law Forum/22.1 
